

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 05157 01 OF 04 261540Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W
-----261544Z 127548 /40
O 261454Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3199

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 5157

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FAHMY

SUMMARY: IN TALK WITH FAHMY TODAY, I WENT
THROUGH TALKING POINTS AS SUPPLEMENTED BY SECRETARY'S
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS. FAHMY INDICATED SADAT ANXIOUS
HAVE ELABORATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S VIEWS,
BUT EXPRESSED SOME MISGIVINGS THAT SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS
OF SADAT VISIT WILL BE MINIMAL. I EMPHASIZED SUCCESS OF
VISIT DEPENDS AS MUCH ON SADAT COMING UP WITH CONCRETE
IDEAS AS IT DOES ON US. PLO REPRESENTATIVE ISSUE STILL
UNRESOLVED AND COULD BE BLOCK TO RECONVENING OF GENEVA AND
RECENT PNC MEETING HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING.
ARAB LEADERS APPEAR TO BE DIVIDED ON THE SUBJECT
AND WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT SADAT WILL HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY
TO CONSULT WITH ASAD PRIOR TO HIS VISIT IN ORDER TO
PRESENT A CONCERTED POSITION ON THE SUBJECT. FAHMY
ARGUED FOR PLO PARTICIPATION AND DOWNPLAYED
PNC MEETING. WHILE ASAD STILL WANTS SINGLE ARAB
DELEGATION, INCLUDING PLO, FAHMY CHARGED
SYRIAN PRESIDENT'S MOTIVE IS TO TIE MORE DIFFICULT
GOLAN SETTLEMENT TO PALESTINE SETTLEMENT. AS FOR HUSSEIN, HE CANNOT
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NEGOTIATE FOR PALESTINIANS AND HAS BEEN POLITICALLY
"KILLED" BY "ZIONISTS" WHO LEAKED INFORMATION ABOUT CIA
SUBVERSION IN ORDER TO PREVENT SYRIAN/JORDAN FEDERATION.
FAHMY ARGUED AGAINST NEED FOR SECURITY FRONTIERS AND
INSISTED THAT ISRAELI DEMANDS FOR "OPEN BORDERS"
SHOULD WORK BOTH WAYS. ON ARMS, I CANDIDLY TOLD FAHMY
PROBLEMS WE FACE AND THAT THERE IS THINKING IN WASHINGTON

THAT ANY FURTHER SALES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO ADDITIONAL C-130'S
AND OTHER PASSIVE KINDS OF EQUIPMENT. FAHMY WAS
DISSAPPOINTED AND STRESSED SADAT'S NEED FOR US ARMS
IN ORDER TO INSURE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY.
I AM SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH SADAT SOME TIME TOMORROW.
END SUMMARY.

1. HAD HOUR AND A HALF MEETING WITH FAHMY THIS MORNING
JUST PRIOR TO HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT.
AFTER WELCOMING ME BACK, FAHMY SAID BOTH HE AND SADAT
WERE ANXIOUS TO HEAR WHAT I MIGHT HAVE TO TELL THEM
ABOUT WASHINGTON VIEWS. THEY HAD READ WITH GREAT INTEREST
THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT CARTER
AND HAD DRAWN CONSIDERABLE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM SOME OF THOSE
STATEMENTS. FAHMY ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS PUZZLED AS TO
EXACTLY WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD IN MIND. THIS GAVE
ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO THROUGH THE VARIOUS TALKING
POINTS AS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE SECRETARY'S ORAL
INSTRUCTIONS TO ME PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE. FOLLOWING
SUMMARIZES THIS PORTION OF OUR TALK:

2. PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT: I TOLD FAHMY THAT PRESIDENT
CARTER IS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
SADAT AND WANTS TO TALK TO SADAT IN ADVANCE OF THE
OTHER ARAB LEADERS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN HIS VIEWS AND
COUNSEL ON HOW TO PROCEED. FAHMY SAID SADAT IS ALSO
LOOKING FORWARD TO THE VISIT, BUT CONFESSED THAT THE
EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP HAS SOME MISGIVINGS THAT ANYTHING
SUBSTANTIVE WILL COME OUT OF THE TALKS. I EMPHASIZED
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TO FAHMY THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE TALKS WILL DEPEND
AS MUCH UPON A CONSTRUCTIVE EGYPTIAN INPUT AS ON
ANYTHING WE MIGHT HAVE TO SAY. THE ARAB/ISRAELI
PROBLEM IS ONE WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BY THE PARTIES
THEMSELVES. OUTSIDERS, SUCH AS WE, CAN ASSIST, BUT
CANNOT IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT. FAHMY AGAIN ARGUED
FOR SOME USG "VISUALIZATION" OF AN EVENTUAL ME PEACE
SETTLEMENT. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD ALREADY PUBLICLY
EXPRESSED SOME VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. SOME WERE
APPRECIATED BY EGYPT AND THE ARABS; OTHERS HAD CAUSED
SOME EMBARRASSMENT AT HOME AND WITH FELLOW ARAB STATES.
HE HOPED, NEVERTHELESS, THAT PRESIDENT
CARTER MIGHT EXPAND UPON THEM.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

3. BASIC ISSUES: I TOLD FAHMY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL WANT TO EXPLORE WITH PRESIDENT SADAT IN DETAIL THE THREE KEY ISSUES: (A) WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES; (B) NATURE OF THE PEACE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN A SETTLEMENT AND (C) QUESTION OF A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. PRESIDENT CARTER WILL WANT TO ELABORATE IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS ON THE IDEAS HE DISCUSSED PUBLICLY ON MARCH 9 AND MARCH 16 ABOUT FINAL BOUNDARIES, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO ACCOMPANY WITHDRAWAL, NORMALIZATION MEASURES IN THE CONTEXT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS. FAHMY OBSERVED THAT PRESIDENT SADAT WILL BE MOST INTERESTED IN HEARING AN ELABORATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S VIEWS.

4. PLO REPRESENTATION: I REMINED FAHMY THAT THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION PROBLEM IS STILL AN IMMEDIATE ISSUE IN TERMS OF CONVENING A GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE LATER THIS YEAR. THE RESULT OF THE PNC MEETING WAS DISAPPOINTING IN THIS RESPECT AND I HAD HEARD CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT NO PROGRESS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MADE TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. FROM SECRETARY VANCE'S VISIT, WE KNOW AND APPRECIATE FACT THAT GOE HAS BEEN LOOKING FOR WAYS
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TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEM AND WE AGREE THIS IS SOMETHING FOR THE ARABS TO DEAL WITH IN FIRST INSTANCE. PRESIDENT CARTER, I EMPHASIZED, WILL WANT TO HEAR IN DETAIL

PRESIDENT SADAT'S LATEST THINKING ON THIS PROBLEM.
IF IT IS NOT SOLVED SOON, WHOLE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
COULD BE BLOCKED AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS MAY HAVE TO FACE
THE QUESTION WHETHER THEY ARE PREPARED TO PERMIT THE
PLO FRUSTRATE THE TALKS

5. PRESIDENT CARTER HOPES THAT
OUT OF HIS UPCOMING TALKS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT
WILL COME SOME CONCRETE INDICATIONS OF THE DIRECTION IN
WHICH SADAT AND THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS WILL WORK TO
FIND A SOLUTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, I NOTE THAT WE
HOPE PRESIDENT SADAT WILL HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO CONCERT
HIS POSITION WITH PRESIDENT ASAD, ESPECIALLY ON THE ISSUE
OF PLO REPRESENTATION AND THE OVERALL PALESTINIAN ISSUE.
DURING HIS RECENT ME TRIP, SECRETARY VANCE HAD
FOUND SOME SIGNIFICANT DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON THE PART
OF THE ARAB LEADERS ON THESE ALL IMPORTANT ISSUES.
AS FAHMY WOULD APPRECIATE, THE LACK OF ARAB AGREEMENT
MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO KNOW HOW TO
MOVE AHEAD.

6. FAHMY ARGUED THAT THE PLO SHOULD BE INVITED AS A
SEPARATE DELEGATION AND, AS HE DID DURING THE
SECRETARY'S VISIT, AGAIN SOUGHT TO EQUATE THE
PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND THE MATTER OF PLO REPRESENTATION.
I KEPT EMPHASIZING THAT THE TWO, WHILE RELATED, MUST
BE LOOKED AT SEPARATELY. NO ONE SERIOUSLY ARGUES
AGAINST THE NEED FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN
ISSUE, BUT PLO PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA IS ANOTHER MATTER.
THE CONTINUED UNWILLINGNESS OF THE PLO EXPLICITLY TO
ACCEPT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, AS EVIDENCED MOST RECENTLY
AT THE PNC, IS HARDLY HELPFUL. FAHMY INSISTED THAT THE
PLO-- WHICH HE REPEATED IS FATAH AND
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NOT THE PRO-SYRIAN OR REJECTIONIST ELEMENTS -- FELT
THAT IT HAD TAKEN STEPS IMPLICITLY TO RECOGNIZE THE
RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST. IT WAS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT
THE PLO, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY,
TO EXPECT EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL
TO EXIST. DOING SO WOULD ONLY WEAKEN THE MODERATE
PLO LEADERSHIP AND PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE REJECTIONISTS.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECRETARY.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3201

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

7. FAHMY NOTED THAT ASAD STILL WANTS A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION, WHICH GOE DOES NOT LIKE. ASAD'S PURPOSE, ACCORDING TO FAHMY, IS TO TIE THE GOLAN ISSUE TO THE PALESTINE ISSUE. NO ONE, FAHMY ARGUED, CAN TIE GOLAN OR THE PALESTINE ISSUE TO EGYPT. IN HIS JUDGEMENT, A SOLUTION OF THE SINAI PROBLEM IS EASIEST TO DEVISE; A PELASTINIAN STATE IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK IS NEXT IN TERMS OF THE DO-ABLE; GOLAN IS MORE DIFFICULT AND JERUSALEM IS MOST DIFFICULT OF ALL. WE SHOULD NOT REFUSE THE PLO THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN GENEVA. THE PLO, ACCORDING TO FAHMY PREFERS TO BE IN AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION, BUT THUS FAR EGYPT HAS REFUSED TO ACCEDE TO THIS DESIRE.

8. THIS LED FAHMY TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF KING HUSSEIN AS A POSSIBLE NEGOTITOR FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE INSISTED THAT, AFTER THE RECENT REVELATION OF CIA ASSISTANCE TO HUSSEIN, NO ONE CAN SIGN ANY PAPER WITH THE KING. THE "ZIONISTS" WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LEAK. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO PREVENT A FEDERATION FROM BEING CONCLUDED BETWEEN SYRIA AND JORDAN WHICH HAD BEEN IMMINENT. THE "ZIONISTS" HAD "KILLED" HUSSEIN, AT LEAST POLITICALLY.

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9. NEED FOR CONCRETE EGYPTIAN IDEAS: I TOLD FAHMY THAT I DID NOT EXPECT HIM TO GIVE ME ANY ANSWERS NOW, BUT WISHED TO ALERT HIM TO THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER DID HOPE THAT PRESIDENT SADAT WILL NOT CONFINE HIS REMARKS TO

GENERALITIES, BUT WILL HAVE SOME CONCRETE IDEAS TO PUT FORWARD ON THE PLO REPRESENTATION ISSUE AS WELL AS THE THREE BASIC ISSUES TO WHICH I HAD ALLUDED. THE SECRETARY'S TALK WITH SADAT AND WITH HIM HAD BEEN HELPFUL, BUT HAD NOT BEEN AS SPECIFIC IN TERMS OF CONCRETE IDEAS AS WE NEED. FAHMY REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE FULLY BRIEFED ON EGYPTIAN THINKING, FAR MORE SO THAN EGYPT IS BRIEFED ON USG THINKING. WITHOUT SOME ACTIVE US INPUT, HE INSISTED, THE ME PEACE PROCESS WILL REMAIN STALLED.

10. BORDERS AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS:
REFERRING TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S MAY 9 COMMENTS ABOUT "LEGAL BORDERS" AND "SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS", FAHMY EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS THINKING OF A 50 KM SECURITY STRIP ALONG THE BORDERS. I REFERRED HIM TO THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN'S COMMENT DENYING THESE PRESS REPORTS. I TOLD HIM THAT THESE ARE MATTERS WHICH CLEARLY REQUIRE DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR TWO SIDES AND THAT THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER HOPES TO DO. ON NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, FAHMY SOCIALLY REFERRED TO THE ISRAELI DEMAND FOR OPEN BORDERS. HE NOTED HIS COMMENTS TO THE PRESS THAT ISRAEL, IF IT INSISTS ON OPEN BORDERS, SHOULD OPEN ITS OWN BORDER FOR FREE PASSAGE OF ARABS, INCLUDING PALESTINIANS. SUCH NORMALIZATION MEASURES MUST WORK BOTH WAYS, NOT JUST ONE. I TOLD HIM I KNEW OF NO OBJECTION ON THE AMERICAN SIDE TO THE MUTUALITY OF SUCH NORMALIZATION MEASURES, BUT AGAIN PRESSED HIM HARD ON THE NEED FOR CONCRETE EGYPTIAN IDEAS ON HOW TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE BASIC ISSUES AND HOW TO RELATE THEM
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ONE TO ANOTHER. FAHMY GRUMBLED THAT WE ARE ASKING ARABS TO DISCLOSE THEIR POSITIONS, BUT ARE NOT REVEALING OURS.

11. ARMS: ALLUDING TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S LATEST STATEMENT ABOUT HIS INTENTIONS TO ASK FOR DEFENSIVE HARDWARE, I TOLD FAHMY THAT I HAD FOUND GREAT SENSITIVITY IN THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY SUPPLY SITUATION. AT THE SAME TIME, I HAD FOUND A STRONG SENSE OF CAUTION RE THE SALE OF US EQUIPMENT. WHETHER ONE LIKES IT OR NOT, THERE IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN THAT, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES, THE ISSUE COULD HARM THE IMPROVED AND MORE UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE THAT HAVE RESULTED LARGELY FROM SADAT'S OWN STATESMANSHIP. PRESIDENT CARTER WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, BUT I THOUGHT I SHOULD IN ALL CANDOR TELL FAHMY THAT THE PROBLEM IS A DIFFICULT ONE. THERE IS SOME

THINKING IN WASHINGTON THAT WE OUGHT TO LIMIT ANY
FURTHER SALES TO ADDITIONAL C-130'S AND PASSIVE
KINDS OF EQUIPMENT. IT IS NOT IN GOE NOR USG INTEREST
TO MAKE PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO
BE TURNED DOWN.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 05157 04 OF 04 261605Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3202

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

12. FAHMY EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT. HE ARGUED
THAT, JUDGING FROM THE REACTIONS OF MANY OF THE
LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICAN CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS
WHO HAVE VISITED EGYPT, THAT THERE IS WIDER CONGRESSIONAL
UNDERSTANDING ON THE DESIRABILITY OF AN ARMS SALES RELATIONSHIP
WITH EGYPT THAT WE CLAIM IS THE CASE. THE SALE OF F-5E'S OR
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, HE ARGUED, WILL NOT EFFECT THE BALANCE
OF POWER AND IS ESSENTIAL TO SADAT IF THE LATTER IS TO
RETAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE ALL-IMPORTANT EGYPTIAN MILITARY.
SADAT IS BOUND TO RAISE THE ISSUE IN WASHINGTON AND
FAHMY HOPED THAT WE HAVE NOT FORECLOSED THE SALE
OF F-5E'S OR SOME OF THE OTHER DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT THAT
EGYPT WOULD LIKE TO PURCHASE. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS,
HE CONTENTED, WILL IN ANY CASE LIMIT EGYPTIAN
PURCHASES.

13. UNSC DEBATE: REPOTED BY SEPTTEL.

14. COMMENT: FAHMY EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH
THE LITTLE I HAD BROUGHT BACK AND WONDERED WHETHER
IT IS A GOOD IDEA FOR SADAT TO GO AT THIS TIME.

MIGHT IT NOT BE WISE TO POSTPONE THE VISIT? I TOLD
HIM THAT I WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE VISIT WILL BE A SUCCESS AND
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EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENTS CARTER AND
SADAT HAVING FULL AND FRANK TALKS AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE. I STRESSED THAT USG IS APPROACHING UPCOMING
VISIT WITH A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND WILL DO EVERYTHING
FEASIBLE TO MAKE THE TALKS A SUCCESS. FAHMY SAID
GOE ALSO ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO UPCOMING TALKS,
BUT REPEATED HIS CONCERN THAT USG POLICY TENDS TO BE
DRIVEN BY GERATER CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI VIEWS THAN BY
A GENUINE DESIRE FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE.
I TOLD HIM HIS JUDGEMENT WAS TOTALLY WRONG. WE ARE DEDICATED
TO WORKING FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE, BUT MUST
UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES IF PROGRESS IS
TO BE MADE.

15. I AM SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH SADAT SOME TIME
TOMORROW.
EILTS

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.

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